Costs of Adopting a Common European Currency. Analysis in Terms of the Optimum Currency Areas Theory by Aura Gabriela SOCOL
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Costs of Adopting a Common European Currency. 
Analysis in Terms of the Optimum Currency  
Areas Theory 
 
 
Aura Gabriela SOCOL 
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies 
aura.socol@economie.ase.ro 
 
       
Abstract. This analysis presents a theoretical approach of the 
possible costs related to a national economy which desires to be part of a 
monetary union. The analysis is made in terms of the classical optimum 
currency areas theory, which represents the basis of the monetary union 
process. The objective of this theory was to make a monetary union 
possible. This theory shows that the countries can obtain net benefits as a 
result of having a common currency, thus being able to avoid the possible 
adjustment problems. As a matter of fact, its great merit is that it 
identified certain properties of the countries being part of a monetary 
union, these properties representing real alternative tools for losing the 
independence of the monetary policy. 
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Introduction 
Although the problem of the monetary unions is more present than ever, 
both for the developed countries which have already joined the Euro Zone, and 
also for the less developed states which are preparing to meet the criteria for 
being accepted, this topic has been put forward  for a long time in the economic 
literature. Thus, the classical optimum currency areas theory – a theory which 
represents the basis of the monetary union term, has come out in 1961 in an 
article presented by Robert Mundell (who is considered to be „the father” of the 
theory referring to the optimum currency areas). The objective of this theory 
was to make a monetary union possible.  
The optimum currency areas (OCA) theory  is based on the above 
mentioned Robert Mundell’s contribution (1961), although the problem has 
been reviewed and added by many other economists, such as Robert McKinnon 
(1963), Peter Kenen (1969) etc. The OCA theory makes researches referring the 
costs and the benefits related to adopting a common currency, being mainly 
focused on costs, their minimization depending on certain conditions which are 
characteristic to the economies of the member countries (the criteria related to 
the optimum currency areas).  
The benefits refer especially to the import of credibility of the monetary 
union’s central bank, which lowers the inflationary expectations and, 
inherently, the level of inflation. The costs are, first of all, related to the effects 
of giving up the independence of the monetary policy and the mechanism of the 
exchange rate, as tools for adjusting the possible asymmetric shocks among the 
members of the monetary union. The lower the need to adjust the rate of 
exchange, the lower costs for taking part to the monetary union, and thus the 
monetary integration is favorable for the members. The theory shows that the 
countries may obtain net benefits as a result of having a common currency, thus 
being able to avoid the possible adjustment problems. 
Costs of adopting a common European currency 
The main problem in the case of the monetary unions is related to the 
costs of this process.  Adopting a common currency brings several benefits, but 
these benefits must be higher than the costs. As for the costs, the most 
important of them are placed at a macroeconomic level and they occur as a 
result of giving up the independence of the monetary policy.  
At a microeconomic  level, we may identify two main costs. The first 
category refers to the operational costs, which are necessary for adjusting the 
systems to the new currency. The second category is represented by strategic 
challenges which consist in re-defining competition and in the occurrence of 
specific risks. Such risks may be caused by an unfavorable rate of a country Costs of Adopting a Common European Currency 
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which joins the monetary union. The mentioned economy may join the union 
with a depreciated currency, thus discovering an increasing competition, and 
also pressures on prices through expensive imports, or with an appreciated 
currency and with the risks of losing competition until adjustments are 
performed by means of other tools (for example, joining the Euro Zone with a 
too high rate of exchange would determine a lower competition of the exports, 
and this will negatively affect the process of economic growth; on the contrary, 
a rate of exchange for which the currency would be depreciated in relation to 
Euro would generate the increase of inflation). 
As we have previously mentioned, the most important costs of joining a 
monetary union are encountered at a macroeconomic level. Generally, at this level, 
the costs occur as a result of the fact that, when taking part to a monetary union, the 
countries lose important tools of the economic policy, respectively those which are 
specific to the monetary policy, namely the handling of the interest charge and of 
the exchange rate. These costs are felt if the asymmetric shocks occur. What does it 
actually involve? The central bank can no longer change the exchange rate of its 
own currency and it cannot determine the quantity of national currency in 
economy; moreover, the member states will influence more or less the process of 
making decisions, depending on several factors, and this situation may be 
perceived as a negative one for the states with a lower influence.  
The extent of the costs related to losing the tools of economic policy depends 
on the differences among the countries. In case these differences are encountered 
both in the economic structure, and also in the legal and institutional systems, those 
economies should have alternatives to the monetary tools in order to adjust the 
shocks. What is important to know is which the nature and the probability of the 
asymmetric shocks are and also what alternative tools could be used in the absence 
of the exchange rate or of the interest charge.  
The particularities or the criteria identified by the optimum currency areas 
theory represent conditions which should be met by the states which desire to 
be members to a favorable monetary union. The existence of these conditions 
makes the occurrence of the asymmetric shocks less probable or, in case of 
occurrence of such shocks, it provides efficient adjustment tools. In other 
words, the costs increase when shocks of the demand or of the offer occur, and 
they affect the economies which take part to the monetary union in a different 
manner, when there are different preferences for unemployment and inflation, 
or legal differences, or differences between the rates of growth, or when the 
adjustment mechanisms are not operational (there are no systems for adjusting 
the shocks, the institutions of the labor market operate in a different manner, or 
there are still differences among the fiscal systems). We will continue with the 
presentation of three of them, which are considered to be significant in the 
economic literature (for a detailed analysis, see de Grauwe, 2007). Aura Gabriela Socol 
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A. The occurrence of the symmetric shocks 
Let us take two countries (X and Y), which are member to a monetary union. 
For various reasons, the aggregate demand (AD) in country X may reach a high 
level in a different manner if compared to the aggregate demand in country Y. For 
example, a shock in demand determines a decrease of the aggregate demand in X 
and an increase of the aggregate demand in Y. In order to illustrate the effects of 
different changes in the aggregate demand, we will use the aggregate demand – 
aggregate offer analysis model (AD-AS) (de Grauwe, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Changes in the aggregate demand 
 
An asymmetric evolution of the aggregate demand would determine different 
consequences in X if compared to Y. Thus, a decrease of the aggregate demand in 
country X from AD1 to AD2 will determine the decrease of the real output, and this 
will inherently determine the decrease of the employment level (the increase of 
unemployment). Within a short time, country X will encounter the situation of 
“twin deficits” (the presence of the budget deficit at the same time with the current 
account deficit) (Figure 1). Budget deficit, as the economy of country X is now 
entering a recession period, and this requires additional budget expenses (for 
example, the budget expenses for stimulating the increase of the output or 
additional costs with the unemployed persons). Current account deficit, as the 
national output decreases, but the consumers’ costs are not decreasing to the same 
extent; as a result, the additional domestic demand will be satisfied by means of 
additional imports. The decrease of the aggregate demand in country X determines 
a decrease of the national output, and also a decrease of prices (deflation). The 
level to which the prices decrease, respectively the level of the real output, depends 
on the slope of the curve for the aggregate offer (its elasticity).       
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In country Y, an increase of the aggregate demand is equal to an increase 
of the real output and, inherently, an increase of the employment degree 
(decrease of unemployment). Unlike X, Y will record a budget surplus and, 
also, a current account surplus. The increase of the demand stimulates the 
increase of the output, on the one hand, and also the increase of prices 
(inflation). We can notice that a shock of the demand creates different problems 
to the two countries. In the absence of the possibility to use the rate of 
exchange
(1), an automatic balance of the two countries’ economies is possible if 
the wages in X and in Y are flexible, and the labor movement is high
(2).  
Why flexible wages? In country X the stimulation of the aggregate offer is 
necessary now; if wages were flexible enough, the unemployed persons would 
accept wages which are lower than the previous ones, and this would allow the 
producer to increase his output and, at the same time, with a lower cost with wages, 
he will be able to lower the selling price; the decrease of prices determines the 
increase of demand for the Romanian products, as they gain competitiveness. In Y, 
the increase of output supposes an increase of labor demand, and this will result in 
an increase of wages and prices. The external demand for its products will lower, 
as they lose their competitiveness while prices get increased. 
Why high labor movement? The country X encounters problems related to 
the increase of unemployment now. If labor were mobile, then the unemployed 
persons from X could migrate in Y, where the labor demand is excessive. The level 
of the expenses lowers, and the current account deficit gets decreased. In Y, wages 
get decreased, as a result of the increase in labor offer; inflation lowers.  
Thus, if the two conditions were met, then the balance between the two 
economies could be “automatically” obtained. In case one of the two conditions 
is not practically achieved, then the adjustment of the shock in terms of demand 
can be exclusively obtained by means of the relative increase of prices in Y (a 
higher inflation) if compared to X, so that the products of the country X could 
become competitive. As a result of the increase in exports, the aggregate 
demand will get increased in X. Thus, the problems of unemployment and of 
current account deficit could be solved. Y can solve the problem of inflation, by 
promoting restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, but it will not solve the 
problem of the excessive current account.  
In order to lower the excessive current account a higher and higher 
inflation is necessary. As X and the Euro Zone constitute a monetary union, it 
gives up the possibility to use the rate of exchange for adjusting the shock of the 
demand (by depreciation). As a consequence, the problems related to 
unemployment and to current account deficit can only be solved by means of 
deflation. Such a problem – inflation or current account unbalance – can be 
solved by means of re-assessment of rate between the currency in country Y and Aura Gabriela Socol 
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the currency in country X. Thus, by depreciating the currency in country X, the 
aggregate demand gets increased in this country, while it gets decreased in Y; in 
X, the problem of unemployment will be solved, while in Y the inflationary 
pressures will thus be avoided; in both countries, the problem of the current 
account deficit/excess will be solved (de Grauwe, 2007). 
 
B.  Different preferences of the countries for inflation and unemployment 
A possible cost of introducing a common currency is determined by the 
fact that the countries may have different preferences with reference to inflation 
– some of the countries have a higher adversity towards inflation than others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The choice inflation-unemployment on a short term 
 
Figure 2 (the right side) presents the Phillips curves for a country Y and a 
country X. The following analysis is only valid when the Phillips curve on a 
short term is stable (the governments may choose between a higher inflation 
and a lower unemployment, for example; at present, the critiques referring to 
the stability of the Phillips curve are known and accepted; according to them, 
when the inflationary expectations are getting increased, the Phillips curve are 
moving upwards, and the authorities can no longer choose various inflation-
unemployment combinations). The vertical axis shows the rate of change referring 
to wages (w), and the horizontal axis shows the rate of unemployment (u).   
 Y 
0 
AY 
CY 
X 
0 
AX 
C X 
 
  e 
u 
u 
w 
w 
п 
п Costs of Adopting a Common European Currency 
 
95 
Figure 3 (the left side) presents the relation between the changes of the 
wages and the changes of the prices, this relation being written as it follows: 
w 
*= Π 
* + q
*,
(3)         ( 1 )  
where, 
w* = the rate of wages increase; 
Π
* = the inflation rate; 
q
* = the growth rate of labor productivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The relation between the changes of the wages and the changes of the prices  
 
According to relation (1), we may write as it follows: 
WY
 *= ΠY
* + qY
*                     (2) 
WX
* = ΠX
* + qX
*                  ( 3 )  
 
Moreover, according to the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory, 
between X and Y we may write the following relation: 
e 
*=  ΠX
*- ΠY
*,                    (4) 
where 
e 
*= the depreciation rate of currency x in relation to currency y.  
    
Relation (4) shows that, when the inflation rate is higher in X than in Y, in 
order not to lose the products competitiveness, the country X should depreciate its 
currency (x) in relation to the currency y. But if X and Y constitute a monetary 
union, then the rate of exchange can no longer be used as a policy tool; as a result,   
e
*= 0, and this means that the inflation rate in Y and in X should be equal.  
In case the inflation rate in X is higher than in Y, under the terms of a 
fixed rate of exchange, the products of the country X lose their competitiveness. 
We assume that the countries Y and X have different preferences for inflation 
and unemployment (Figure 2). X chooses to be placed in point CX, while Y 
chooses the combination which is specific to point AY; thus, X prefers a lower 
unemployment and a higher inflation, while Y chooses the reverse combination, 
namely a lower inflation with a higher cost for unemployment. The cost of a 
monetary union between X and Y consists in the fact that both X and Y should 
w 
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accept other inflation-unemployment combinations, respectively the placement 
in other points of the Phillips curve, even though they are less suitable. As long 
as the inflation rates are different, a fixed rate of exchange between the 
currency x and the currency y is not sustainable.  
In order to keep the fixed rate of exchange between the currency x and the 
currency y, the inflation rates in the two areas should be equal (e
*= 0). Thus, X 
is moving on the Phillips curve up to point AX, while Y should choose point CY. 
In this way, WY
* increases, and WX
* decreases; according to relation (1), ΠY
* 
will increase in Y, and ΠX
* will decrease, and thus the inflation rates in the two 
areas will become equal. 
According to the economic theory, the Phillips curve is vertical on a long 
term (Figure 4), and the intersection between the Phillips curve on a long term 
and the horizontal axis represents the natural rate of unemployment. In other 
words, on a long term, unemployment is determined by the natural rate of 
unemployment and it depends on inflation, and the authorities can no longer 
choose between inflation and unemployment. Thus, on a long term, in the case 
of a monetary union, X and Y can equalize their inflation rates by establishing a 
fixed rate of exchange between currency x and y, without any costs in terms of 
unemployment; taking into account the fact that, at least on a short term, the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off exists, we may say that, for the countries 
recording high inflation rates, joining a monetary union suppose, on a short 
term, the acceptance of a higher unemployment. 
Thus, we may draw the conclusion that the differences among the countries 
regarding the preferences for inflation and unemployment do not constitute a major 
obstacle in achieving a monetary union, as, on a long term, the authorities cannot 
choose an optimum combination between inflation and unemployment.   
 
The Phillips curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Phillips curve on a long term 
 
Another possible cost occurred as a result of introducing a common 
currency is given by the possible productivity differences among the countries 
which are members to the monetary union. We assume that the productivity rate 
(q*) is higher in Y than in X (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Costs determined by the productivity differences 
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*.  
If the productivity rates are different in the two areas (lower in X) and 
they decide to constitute a monetary union, then the increases of the nominal 
wages in X should be lower than those recorded in EU. If, for various reasons, 
this does not happen, then costs occur.   
 
C. Differences among the fiscal systems of the countries 
Joining a monetary union supposes that the involved countries accept 
some constraints with reference to the modality of financing the budget deficits. 
Due to the differences among the fiscal systems, the countries use different 
financing combinations by means of indebtness and monetary financing of the 
budget deficits. The budget constraint is as it follows: 
G – T + rB = dB/dt + dM/dt,       
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where:  
G = the level of the government expenses; 
(minus the payments with interest for the government debt); 
T = taxation revenues; 
r = interest charge for the government debt; 
B = the government debt; 
M = the monetary base. 
      
The budget deficit includes the primary deficit (G – T) and the payments 
with interest for the government debt (rB); if can be financed either by indebtness 
(dB/dt), or by increasing the monetary base (dM/dt). A reasonable government will 
use different revenues sources so that it could equalize the marginal costs for 
increasing revenues by means of these sources; in case the marginal cost for 
increasing revenues by means of increasing taxation exceeds the marginal cost for 
increasing revenues by means of inflation (seniorship), a government chooses the 
variant of increasing inflation. Thus, generally, the countries with under-developed 
fiscal systems consider an advantage to increase their budget revenues by means of 
inflation (seniorship), as the costs for increasing the budget revenues by means of 
increasing taxation are higher than the costs for increasing the budget revenues by 
means of inflation (Burda, Wyplosz, 1997). 
As a conclusion, the less developed countries which join more developed 
countries in a monetary union should increase taxation in order to finance their 
deficit. But the increase of taxation in the less developed countries will result in 
losing from welfare.  
Conclusions 
Thus, the analysis from above outlines the significant differences existing 
among countries. Moreover, we can mention here the legal differences, 
differences between the rates of growth, or when the adjustment mechanisms 
are not operational (there are no systems for adjusting the shocks, the 
institutions of the labor market operate in a different manner, or there are still 
differences among the fiscal systems).  
In order to adjust these differences, the countries may use various tools of 
economic policy, or the exchange rate tool. According to the optimum currency 
areas theory, in most of the cases, the countries have tools available which are 
alternatives to the rate of exchange. But joining a monetary union is not desirable 
as long as its costs are higher then the benefits, and the differences among the 
countries are big, thus making the objective of minimizing the costs difficult.  
The differences among the countries exist, but the problem is to what extent 
these differences are relevant, so that their presence could prevent the achievement of Costs of Adopting a Common European Currency 
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a monetary union. There are significant differences among the countries, which do 
not disappear in a monetary union. Giving up the exchange rate tool may be 
considered a cost of the monetary union. And changing the rate of exchange is a 
strong tool which is available to the countries which desire to eliminate the major 
macroeconomic unbalances, with lower costs in terms of output and unemployment.    
We should mention that handling the rate of exchange does not 
permanently affect the real variables (output and employment). Moreover, the 
experiences of several countries show that, when depreciation is used in a 
systematic manner, the result is the increase of inflation, without gains in terms 
of output and employment. Moreover, in such cases, the macroeconomic 
instability gets increased, due to the inflationary expectations of the private 
economic agents, who expect new depreciations. The depreciation is not a 
flexible tool and it is neither less expensive.  
As a consequence, the changes of the nominal exchange rate only 
temporarily affect the competitiveness of a country’s industries. Thus, the 
nominal depreciations only temporarily result in real depreciations. On a long 
term, the changes of the nominal rate of exchange do not affect the real rate of 
exchange of a country’s currency.  
To conclude, on a long term, the rate of exchange (the tool which is given up 
by joining a monetary union) does not solve the problems generated by the 
characteristics which are specific to the goods market from various countries. The 
solutions to the problems generated by the structural differences among the countries 
are related to the structural policies, and not to the monetary policies. Handling the 
cash or the rate of exchange cannot solve the problems generated by the structural 
differences among the countries, at least not on a long term. The differences among 
the countries exist, but the problem is to what extent these differences are relevant, so 
that their presence could prevent the achievement of a monetary union.  
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 Notes 
 
(1)  We initially assumed that the two countries are part of a monetary union. 
(2)  Solution proposed by Robert Mundell. 
(3)  The relation defines the rate of change for the prices which keep the profits unchanged. Aura Gabriela Socol 
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